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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE GIFTED AND TALENTED 
PROGRAM 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK COUNTY 
 
Matter of R.B. v. Department of Education of the City of New York1 
(decided August 1, 2013) 
 
The parents of children who were seeking admission into the 
“Gifted and Talented” (“G&T”) program in the New York City pub-
lic school system claimed that the admission process “violate[d] the 
Equal Protection [C]lause of the New York State Constitution by giv-
ing preference to applicants who already ha[d] siblings in the G&T 
program.”2  The New York Supreme Court held that there was no vi-
olation of the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.3  The 
court stated, “a policy withstands a constitutional challenge if it ‘ra-
tionally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose . . . .’ ”4  
The court concluded that the Department of Education’s policy of 
admitting students into the G&T program was within its discretion.5 
I. HISTORY 
In 1931, the United States Department of Education created 
the first federal program for gifted education.6  The program laid the 
foundation for future programs but lacked specific legislative authori-
ty.7  In 1950, the National Science Foundation Act was enacted by 
 
1 No. 100738-13, 2013 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3412, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at *14. 
4 Id. at *15. 
5 Id. at *17. 
6 Charles J. Russo, Unequal Educational Opportunities For Gifted Students: Robbing Pe-
ter to Pay Paul?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 727, 733 (2001). 
7 Id. 
1
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Congress.8  The act “not only directed resources toward the develop-
ment of the sciences and basic research, but for the first time focused 
federal attention on the nation’s gifted and talented.”9  The act en-
couraged careers in mathematics and physical sciences.10  However, 
from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the focus was on desegrega-
tion in schools, not gifted education.11  In the 1950s, programs for the 
gifted were diverted because of the focus on disadvantaged students 
and the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.12  
Finally, in 1970, The Gifted and Talented Children’s Education As-
sistance Act was passed.13  The act “gave the first federal statutory 
definition of the term ‘gifted,’ called for the development of model 
programs, and made programs eligible for federal financial assis-
tance.”14 
The Commissioner of Education assessed the programs for 
the gifted and submitted his report to Congress in October of 1972.15  
The report pushed for the support and development of gifted pro-
grams.16  As a result, the Office of the Gifted and Talented was creat-
ed in 1974.17  Additionally, funds were made available to education 
agencies for the gifted.18  Then, in 1978, The Gifted and Talented 
Children’s Education Assistance Act extended funding to provide 
separate programs for gifted students.19  However, the act was re-
pealed in 1981 by President Reagan when the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act was passed, and the Office of Gifted and Talented 
was closed.20 
Education reform was brought back into Congress’s focus in 
 
8 42 U.S.C. § 1871 (1950). 
9 Id. (quoting Jeffrey J. Zettel, The Education of Gifted and Talented Children from a 
Federal Perspective, in JOSEPH BALLARD ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: ITS LEGAL 
AND GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS 51 (1982)). 
10 Id. 
11 Russo, supra note 6, at 734. 
12 Id. at 737-38 (stating that this act was “vital and necessary in looking after the needs of 
disadvantaged students”); 20 U.S.C. § 6391 (2002) (stating the purpose was to support mi-
gratory children). 
13 Russo, supra note 6, at 738. 
14 Id. at 738-39. 
15 Id. at 739. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Russo, supra note 6, at 740. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
2
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the 1990s when the Jacob Javits Gifted and Talented Students Act 
(“JGTSA”) of 1994 was passed.21  The JGTSA updated and expanded 
previous acts and provided “priority funding for programs to serve 
gifted students who are economically disadvantaged, speak limited 
English, or have disabilities.”22  The JGTSA, however, did not man-
date that gifted programs be created.23  The most recent piece of leg-
islation was The Gifted and Talented Education Act that was pro-
posed in 2001.24  Since then, the states have taken over the support 
and funding of gifted programs.25 
II. BACKGROUND 
The New York City Department of Education (“DOE”) pro-
posed two changes to the G&T program in the New York City public 
schools.26  First, the DOE proposed to eliminate preferential treat-
ment given to children that had siblings already in the G&T program 
(“sibling preference”).27  Second, the DOE proposed to change the 
way in which the percentile scoring was to be calculated.28  The DOE 
followed Education Law § 2590-g29 and posted notice to the public 
on its website of the proposed changes and invited public comment 
about such changes.30  The changes were also posted in the G&T 
Handbook for the 2012-2013 academic year.31  The proposed change 
 
21 20 U.S.C. §§ 8031-37 (repealed Jan. 8, 2002). 
22 Russo, supra note 6, at 741. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 742. 
26 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *3-4. 
27 Id. at *4. 
28 Id. 
29 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-g(8)(a) (McKinney 2009): 
Prior to the approval of any proposed item listed in subdivision one of 
this section, undertake a public review process to afford the public an 
opportunity to submit comments on the proposed item.  Such public re-
view process shall include notice of the item under city board considera-
tion which shall be made available to the public, including via the city 
board’s official internet website, and specifically circulated to all com-
munity superintendents, community district education councils, commu-
nity boards, and school based management teams, at least forty-five days 
in advance of any city board vote on such item. 
Id. 
30 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *4. 
31 Id. 
3
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to the scoring methodology received negative public comments; 
therefore, the DOE decided not to implement the change until further 
analysis was completed.32  The proposed elimination of the sibling 
preference also largely received comments of opposition.33  The DOE 
notified the interested parties, all families who had submitted a re-
quest for testing, of its decision to “use the ‘same process and policy’ 
that had been used” in the previous year.34  This admission process 
consisted of placing, in citywide programs, siblings in or above the 
97th percentile of currently enrolled students first, and in district pro-
grams, siblings in or above the 90th percentile of currently enrolled 
students first.35  Once all eligible siblings were placed, then all non-
sibling applicants were placed based on their percentile rank.36  If 
there was a tie or an insufficient number of seats, there would be a 
random drawing to determine who would receive an offer.37 
In Matter of R.B., the parents (“petitioners”) of the children 
that wanted to be accepted into the G&T program brought suit 
against the DOE for violating the Equal Protection Clause.  Under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the New York State Constitution Article I, 
§ 11, “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of 
this state or any subdivision thereof.”38  The court stated that the 
Equal Protection Clause was no broader than the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.39  The petitioners clas-
sified their children as a “suspect” class in order to receive a strict 
scrutiny review.40  However, the court stated the classification for 
strict scrutiny “refers to a party’s racial or national background, and 
not to the child’s status as a sibling.”41  If there is no “suspect” classi-
fication, the level of judicial scrutiny does not rise and rational basis 
 
32 The G&T Handbook provides the community with information about the program.  Id. 
at *5, *7. 
33 Id. at *5. 
34 Id. at *7. 
35 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *7-8. 
36 Id. at *8. 
37 Id. 
38 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
39 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *14-15. 
40 Id. at *15.  Strict scrutiny is when the court reviews a classification to determine wheth-
er the law or regulation is supported by a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.  Strict scrutiny is applied when a fundamental right is at issue or in-
volves a suspect class.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Regents of Univ. 
of Califormia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
41 Id. 
4
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review applies, which provides that “a policy withstands a constitu-
tional challenge if it ‘rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated 
state purpose . . . .’ ”42 
The petitioners challenged the DOE’s admission process, 
claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious and that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.43  The petitioners specifically asserted that 
“the DOE’s methodology gives ‘preferential treatment’ to children 
with siblings already enrolled in G&T programs in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution.”44  The court rec-
ognized that the DOE only needed to “demonstrate a rational basis 
for its admission policy.”45  The court reasoned that the DOE’s ra-
tional, legitimate state purpose was that the sibling preference was in 
place to reduce the burden on families with two or more siblings hav-
ing to attend two different schools.46  Therefore, there was no viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.47 
The petitioners’ argument that the admission process was ar-
bitrary and capricious, according to § 7803(3) of the New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules,48 was rejected by the court.49  The court stat-
ed that the statutory right of the petitioners was a “right to a ‘sound 
basic education’ and not to a particular type of educational pro-
gram.”50  Additionally, the court found that the school administrators 
had broad discretion in determining the design of educational pro-
grams51 and that the judiciary should not interfere unless there was a 
violation of the law.52  The court concluded that the sibling prefer-
ence and scoring methodology were “an educational policy that 
f[e]ll[] within the DOE’s discretion.”53  The court held that although 
the policies “may not be perfect,” the petitioners did not establish that 
 
42 Id. (quoting Archbishop Walsh High School v. Section VI of the N.Y. State Pub. High 
School Athletic Ass’n, 666 N.E.2d 521 (1996)). 
43 Id. at *9. 
44 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *10. 
45 Id. at *15. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at *14. 
48 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 2003). 
49 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *15-16. 
50 Id. at *16 (citing New York City Liberties Union v. State of New York, 824 N.E.2d 947 
(N.Y. 2005)); see also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (McKinney 2013). 
51 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *16. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at *17. 
5
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the policies were arbitrary or capricious.54 
The court in Matter of R.B. cited the case Korematsu v. Unit-
ed States.55  In Korematsu, the Court stated that “the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”56  The court in Matter of 
R.B. also referred to the case Esler v. Walters,57 which established 
that the State’s Equal Protection Clause is no broader than the Four-
teenth Amendment.58  Additionally, the court in Matter of R.B. cited 
the case Archbishop Walsh High School v. Section VI of the New 
York State Public High School Athletic Association.59  In Archbishop, 
the court found that absent a “suspect” classification that raised the 
level of judicial scrutiny, a policy withstands a constitutional chal-
lenge if it “rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose and therefore does not . . . violat[e] the Equal Protection 
Clause.”60 
The DOE argued that relief should not be granted to the peti-
tioners because they failed to exhaust administrative remedies.61  The 
DOE claimed that pursuant to Education Law § 310(7),62 the peti-
tioners should have appealed to the State Commissioner of Educa-
tion.63  The court disagreed with the DOE.64  The court stated that the 
language in the statute suggested a remedy; it did not mandate the pe-
titioner to seek relief from the State Commissioner of Education.65  
 
54 Id. 
55 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
56 Id. at 216. 
57 437 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1982). 
58 Id. at 1094. 
59 666 N.E.2d 521 (N.Y. 1996). 
60 Id. at 523. 
61 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *11. 
62 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 310(7) (McKinney 2013); 
Any party conceiving himself aggrieved may appeal by petition to the 
commissioner of education who is hereby authorized and required to ex-
amine and decide the same; and the commissioner of education may also 
institute such proceedings as are authorized under this article.  The peti-
tion may be made in consequence of any action: By any other official act 
or decision of any officer, school authorities, or meetings concerning any 
other matter under this chapter, or any other act pertaining to common 
schools. 
Id. 
63 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *11. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at *11-12. 
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The court also recognized that there was an exception to seeking re-
lief from the State Commissioner of Education where “pursuit of the 
administrative remedy may be futile or lead to irreparable harm due 
to processing delays.”66  The court stated that there was a “need for 
prompt certainty as to the schooling arrangements for their children 
for th[at] September.”67  Thus, the court held that the petitioners did 
not need to pursue administrative remedies before commencing the 
proceeding.68 
III. FEDERAL APPROACH 
A. Supreme Court 
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,69 a Seattle school district voluntarily adopted a student 
assignment plan to determine which schools certain children could 
attend when too many students listed the same school as their first 
choice for attendance.70  The district had three “tiebreakers” to select 
the students who would attend the oversubscribed school.71  The first 
tiebreaker gave children who already had a sibling enrolled in the 
chosen school admission to that school.72  The second tiebreaker was 
dependent on the racial composition of the chosen school and the 
race of the individual student.73  If the chosen school was not within 
the percentage of 41% white and 59% “non-white,” then the tie-
breaker selected the student whose race “w[ould] serve to bring the 
school into balance.”74  The final tiebreaker, if necessary, was the 
student’s geographic proximity of the school to their residence.75 
Parents Involved in Community Schools (“Parents Involved”) 
was a nonprofit corporation of the parents of children who had been 
or could be denied admission to their chosen school because of their 
 
66 Id. at 12 (citing Matter of Cmty. Sch. Bd. Nine v. Crew, 648 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 
1st Dep’t 1996)). 
67 Id. 
68 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *12. 
69 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
70 Id. at 709-10. 
71 Id. at 711. 
72 Id. at 711-12. 
73 Id. at 712. 
74 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712. 
75 Id. 
7
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race.76  The Ninth Circuit held that the Seattle school district’s plan 
was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”77  
The Supreme Court recognized that when “the government distrib-
utes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifica-
tions, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.”78 
The Court found two interests that qualify as compelling for 
purposes of the strict scrutiny test.79  The first is the compelling inter-
est of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination, and 
the other is the interest in diversity in higher education.80  The Court 
found that race was the determinative factor alone and race was not 
“considered as part of a broader effort to achieve ‘exposure to widely 
diverse people, cultures, ideas and viewpoints.’ ”81  The school dis-
tricts were using racial balancing for the purpose of improving demo-
graphic equality, not educational benefits.82  The Supreme Court 
overruled the Ninth Circuit’s decision stating, “[t]he way to stop dis-
crimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”83  The Supreme Court held that the school district did not “carr[y] 
the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this . . . .”84 
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger.85  
The University of Michigan Law School had an admission policy that 
sought to achieve diversity in the student body.86  The policy required 
admissions officials to assess applicants based on a range of infor-
mation, including the applicant’s essay, which explained how he or 
she would contribute to law school life and diversity; letters of rec-
ommendation; the Law School Admission Test; and undergraduate 
grade point average.87  The admission policy “reaffirm[ed] the Law 
School’s commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclu-
sion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, 
who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in mean-
 
76 Id. at 713. 
77 Id. at 715. 
78 Id. at 720. 
79 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. 
80 Id. at 720-22. 
81 Id. at 723 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003)). 
82 Id. at 726. 
83 Id. at 748. 
84 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747. 
85 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
86 Id. at 306. 
87 Id. 
8
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ingful numbers.”88  The Law School claimed that “[b]y enrolling a 
‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students, the policy 
seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School’s charac-
ter and to the legal profession.”89  The petitioner, a white female, 
claimed that the respondents violated the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause the Law School had discriminated against her based on her 
race.90  The petitioner alleged that “the Law School use[d] race as a 
‘predominant’ factor, giving applicants belonging to certain minority 
groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with 
similar credentials from disfavored racial groups; and that respond-
ents had no compelling interest to justify that use of race.”91 
The Court stated that “all racial classifications imposed by 
government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny.’ ”92  Furthermore, the Court reasoned that strict scrutiny is ap-
plied to racial classifications “to ‘smoke’ out illegitimate uses of race 
by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to 
warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”93  The Court recognized that it 
was following its precedent by showing deference to the university’s 
academic decisions.94  The Court found that the Law School’s admis-
sion policy considered many factors, race only being one of those 
factors, to create a diverse student body.95  Finally, the Court held 
that the Law School’s use of race in its admission policy furthered the 
compelling interest of the educational benefits that flow from a di-
verse student body.96  Justice Thomas stated, in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion, that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit 
the use of unseemingly “legacy preferences” or many other kinds of 
arbitrary admissions procedures, but it does prohibit classifications 
made on the basis of race.97 
 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. at 227). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 328. 
95 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. 
96 Id. at 343. 
97 Id. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
9
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B. Lower Courts 
The lower federal courts have addressed admission policies, 
such as a past academic achievement and a sibling preference.  The 
Ninth Circuit reviewed an admission standard in Berkelman v. San 
Francisco United School District.98  The question before the court in 
Berkelman was whether an admission standard substantially furthered 
the school’s purpose.99  The admission policy was based on the stu-
dents’ past academic achievement standard.100  The court held that 
the school district’s past academic achievement standard substantially 
furthered the purpose of providing the best education possible for the 
students in the school district.101  The court recognized that “[t]he 
cutoff is the result of space and budget limitations, not the result of a 
perfect determination of who can and who cannot benefit from the 
program.”102  Students who were not admitted to the program were 
not “denied a quality education nor relegated to an inadequate 
school.”103 
In 1986, the district court decided United States v. Yonkers 
Board of Education.104  The Yonkers Board of Education created an 
Educational Improvement Plan, which the plaintiffs objected to.105  
The Board then submitted a modified plan.106  The modified plan in-
cluded a sibling preference for admission to magnet schools.107  
When an applicant met all of the admission criteria, preference would 
be given to siblings of children already enrolled in magnet schools.108  
The court ordered the Board’s modified plan effective.109  Both of the 
Federal lower courts found that the admission policies were accepta-
ble. 
 
98 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974). 
99 Id. at 1267. 
100 Id. at 1268. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Berkelman, 501 F.2d at 1268. 
104 No. 80 Civ. 6761, 1986 WL 4894, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 22, 1986). 
105 Id. at *8. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at *13. 
108 Id. 
109 Yonkers Bd. Of Ed., 1986 WL 4894, at *31. 
10
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IV. STATE APPROACH 
A. New York Court of Appeals 
The New York Court of Appeals has not addressed the specif-
ic issue of a sibling preference based admission policy, however the 
Court has reviewed the Equal Protection Clause.  Although the facts 
in People v. Parker110 are not exactly the same as the facts of Matter 
of R.B., the court in Matter of R.B. addressed the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The court stated that “[t]he [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause 
does not mandate absolute equality of treatment but merely pre-
scribes that, absent a fundamental interest or suspect classification, a 
legislative classification be rationally related to a legitimate state 
purpose.”111 
In 1976, the New York Court of Appeals, in Alevy v. Down-
state Medical Center,112 also looked at the Equal Protection Clause in 
relation to a medical school’s admission policy.113  The plaintiff ap-
plied to Downstate Medical Center, the defendant, for admission to 
the 1974 to 1975 program.114  The admission committee gave each 
applicant a “screening code,” which determined whether the appli-
cant would be considered for a personal interview; however, persons 
that claimed to be from a minority group were given a preliminary 
screening by the committee regardless of their “screening code.”115  
The minority applicants that were interviewed exceeded the amount 
of other applicants by 12%.116  The admission committee looked at 
whether the minority applicant was financially or educationally dis-
advantaged, and the committee placed a high priority on those fac-
tors.117  The plaintiff was placed on the second waiting list.118  There 
were sixty-six minority students that were accepted to the program, 
and the plaintiff had a higher Medical College Admission Test 
(“MCAT”) score than every one of the accepted minority students.119  
 
110 359 N.E.2d 348 (N.Y. 1976). 
111 Id. at 350-51. 
112 348 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1976). 
113 Id. at 542. 
114 Id. at 540. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Alevy, 348 N.E.2d at 541. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 542. 
11
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The plaintiff claimed that the admission policy that “g[ave] less qual-
ified minority applicants a greater opportunity for acceptance [wa]s 
violative of the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause.”120  The plaintiff urged 
that the strict scrutiny test be applied in this case, but the court re-
fused to do so.121  The court decided to apply a middle ground analy-
sis between the strict scrutiny test and the rationally-related test.122  
The court stated, 
In determining whether a substantial State interest un-
derlies a preferential treatment policy, courts should 
inquire whether the policy has a substantial basis in 
actuality, and is not merely conjectural.  At a mini-
mum, the State-sponsored scheme must further some 
legitimate, articulated governmental purpose.  Howev-
er, the interest need not be urgent, paramount or com-
pelling.  Thus, to satisfy the substantial interest re-
quirement, it need be found that, on balance, the gain 
to be derived from the preferential policy outweighs 
its possible detrimental effects.123 
The court stated that if there was a substantial interest, it must look at 
whether the objectives of the policy could be achieved alternative-
ly.124  Although the court did not determine the ultimate issue in this 
case because the plaintiff did not set out a primia facie case, the court 
did set out a test to review an admission policy.125 
B. Lower Courts 
The lower courts in New York have reviewed the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  In Bradstreet v. Sobol,126 the plaintiff’s daughter was 
home schooled and was not enrolled in a public school.127  Her 
daughter wanted to participate in the local school’s interscholastic 
sports program.128  However, the school did not allow her to partici-
 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 542. 
122 Alevy, 348 N.E.2d at 544. 
123 Id. at 545. 
124 Id. at 546. 
125 Id. at 547. 
126 650 N.Y.S.2d 402 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1996). 
127 Id. at 403. 
128 Id. 
12
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pate because in order to be a part of the school’s interscholastic sports 
program, the child had to be enrolled in their school.129  The court re-
viewed the issue of the eligibility requirement based on whether there 
was a “rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose” because the 
daughter was classified as a non-suspect class.130  The daughter’s 
classification was based on her lack of enrollment in the public 
school where she wanted to participate in the sports program.131  The 
defendant’s justification for requiring enrollment was that it promot-
ed school spirit and loyalty.132  The court found nothing irrational 
about the requirement and held that there was no violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.133  The court reasoned that it was “rational 
to require that a student who seeks to represent a school in interscho-
lastic athletic competition be enrolled in the school . . . [and the] 
plaintiff ha[d] no legitimate claim that her daughter [wa]s an appro-
priate representative of the public school for competition with other 
schools.”134 
The Supreme Court in New York County addressed the issue 
of equal protection in In re Downey.135  The court held that equal pro-
tection “does not require that all persons be dealt with identically.”136  
However, it does require “that distinction among classes must be rea-
sonable.”137  Although the Supreme Court and Appellate Division of 
New York did not address admission policies, the courts analysis did 
review the Equal Protection Clause. 
V. EVALUATION 
After evaluating the federal approach and the New York State 
approach on the issue of an admission policy under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, it is reasonable to conclude the court in Matter of R.B. 
followed the proper level of scrutiny when determining whether the 
sibling preference admission policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.  New York courts have dealt with the Equal Protection 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Bradstreet, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 403. 
132 Id. at 404. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Fam. Ct. 1973). 
136 Id. at 690. 
137 Id. 
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Clause, but Matter of R.B. was the first case in which the addressed 
an admission policy to a G&T program.  Matter of R.B. is important 
because the court identified that the admission policy was within the 
DOE’s discretion and did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.138 
The plaintiffs in Matter of R.B. brought this case because they 
claimed the DOE’s admission policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause by giving preference to children with siblings already in the 
program.139  The court cited Korematsu as authority to state that the 
plaintiffs’ children were not to be classified as a suspect class be-
cause “[t]hat classification refers to a party’s racial or national back-
ground.”140  The court in Grutter stated that the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prohibit different types of arbitrary admission proce-
dures, such as “legacy preferences.”141  The court in Matter of R.B. 
correctly ruled that the sibling preference did not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause because, as stated in Grutter, the classification was 
not based on race, but instead was analogous to a legacy preference. 
Further, Parents Involved is distinguishable from Matter of 
R.B. because the Court in Parents Involved reviewed the case under 
strict scrutiny, whereas the court in Matter of R.B. reviewed the case 
based on the rational basis test.142  The Court in Parents Involved re-
viewed the case under strict scrutiny because the student assignment 
plan was based on race.143  The court in Matter of R.B. appropriately 
applied the rational basis test instead of reviewing the case under 
strict scrutiny because the admission policy was based on sibling 
preference, not race.  The New York Court of Appeals in Parker ad-
dressed the issue of the level of scrutiny to be used by courts.144  The 
court in Matter of R.B. properly followed the precedent set out in 
Parker because there was no fundamental interest or suspect classifi-
cation.145  Thus, the court looked at whether the classification was ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state purpose.146  Additionally, in 
Bradstreet the court reviewed the case based on the rational relation-
ship to a legitimate state purpose and determined that the school’s 
 
138 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *17. 
139 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
140 Matter of R.B., 2013 LEXIS 3412, at *15. 
141 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
142 See supra notes 78-80, 45 and accompanying text. 
143 See supra notes 73, 74, 78 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
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policy promoted school spirit and loyalty.147  Therefore, in Matter of 
R.B., the court properly recognized that the admission policy rational-
ly furthered a legitimate purpose by showing that the policy intended 
to relieve the burden on families with two or more siblings having to 
attend two different schools.148 
The court’s decision in Matter of R.B. is consistent with the 
Court’s recognition in Berkelman that there was no perfect determi-
nation of who could and could not benefit from the program.149  In 
Matter of R.B., the court correctly determined that the admission pol-
icy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the court fol-
lowed the precedent of the Southern District of New York, when it 
upheld an admission policy that included a sibling preference in Yon-
kers Board of Education.150 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This case was brought up to the Appellate Division, First De-
partment.151  This court affirmed the lower court’s decision that the 
sibling preference policy did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.152  This court followed the same reasoning stating that “the policy 
‘rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose.’ ”153 
The court’s decision in Matter of R.B. was a fair one.  The 
court correctly applied the rational basis test to determine whether the 
sibling preference of the admission policy violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  Although this case was not decided by the New York 
Court of Appeals, it will have future implications.  No matter the spe-
cific admission program preference, future courts will be able to ap-
ply the same test as this court.  The courts will be able to review the 
admission policy preference and determine if it has a legitimate state 
purpose, just as the court in Matter of R.B. did.  This court’s decision 
was not outrageous or inconsistent that it would be overturned and 
not followed by future courts. 
 
147 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
149 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
151 R.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of the City of New York, 981 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep’t 2014). 
152 Id. at 414. 
153 Id. 
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